Starker v. United States (9th Cir. 1979): delayed exchanges, the origin of deferred 1031
In Starker v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that a contract right to receive real property later was of a like kind with ownership, because T. J. Starker preferred property to cash before and throughout the executory period and ultimately received only like-kind property (602 F.2d 1341, para. 82). Results depend on specific facts.
This page is general research, not tax, legal, or investment advice. Do not take any action based on this page without first consulting a qualified CPA or tax attorney who knows your facts.
Case facts602 F.2d 1341, 79-2 USTC P 9541
Case at a glance
Starker v. United States is a Ninth Circuit tax refund case decided August 24, 1979, reported at 602 F.2d 1341, docket No. 77-2826. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It addressed collateral estoppel, delayed receipt of replacement real property, transfers to a relative, and a 6 percent growth factor.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Court | United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit |
| Decided | August 24, 1979 |
| Citation | 602 F.2d 1341, 79-2 USTC P 9541 |
| Docket | No. 77-2826 |
| Panel | Goodwin and Anderson, Circuit Judges, and Jameson, District Judge, sitting by designation |
| Opinion by | Judge Goodwin |
| Appeal from | United States District Court for the District of Oregon |
| Disposition | Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded (paras. 89 to 90) |
Facts of the Crown Zellerbach exchange
On April 1, 1967, T. J. Starker, his son, and his daughter-in-law agreed to convey Oregon timberland to Crown Zellerbach Corporation. Crown agreed to acquire other real property and deed it to them within five years or pay any outstanding balance in cash. The last transfer for T. J. Starker occurred about two years after the timberland was deeded.
- The agreement (April 1, 1967). The Starkers would convey 1,843 acres of timberland in Columbia County, Oregon. Crown would acquire and deed over real property in Washington and Oregon. Crown would add a "growth factor" each year equal to 6 percent of the outstanding balance (para. 2).
- The conveyance (May 31, 1967). The Starkers deeded the timberland to Crown. Crown recorded "exchange value credits" of $1,502,500 for T. J. Starker and $73,000 for Bruce and Elizabeth Starker (para. 3).
- The son and daughter-in-law. Within four months, they received three parcels with an agreed value of $73,000. No growth factor or cash was involved (para. 4).
- T. J. Starker. From July 1967 through May 1969, Crown acquired 12 parcels he selected. Crown bought 9 from third parties and conveyed them to him. It conveyed two (Timian and Bi-Mart) to his daughter, Jean Roth, at his direction. For the twelfth (Booth), Crown bought a third party's contract right to purchase and reassigned it to him (para. 5).
- Transfer dates and balance. The first transfer from Crown to T. J. Starker or his daughter was September 5, 1967, and the last was May 21, 1969. By 1969 the growth factor had raised his credit to $1,577,387.91. The parties valued the land transferred to him and Roth at exactly that amount, so no cash was paid (para. 6).
- The dispute. The Starkers reported no gain on their 1967 returns. The IRS disagreed and assessed deficiencies of $300,930.31 plus interest against T. J. Starker and $35,248.41 against Bruce and Elizabeth Starker (paras. 7, 10).
- Prior litigation. In Starker I, the district court ruled for Bruce and Elizabeth Starker in 1975, relying on Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). The government dismissed its appeal. In Starker II, the same judge reversed course and ruled for the government, 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977) (paras. 11 to 15).
Issues on appeal
T. J. Starker argued that the district court erred on three points. These were the denial of section 1031 nonrecognition for his real estate transactions, the refusal to bar the government by collateral estoppel, and the treatment of part of his receipts as ordinary interest income in addition to capital gain (para. 16).
- Whether the transactions qualified for nonrecognition under section 1031.
- Whether the judgment in Starker I collaterally estopped the government from relitigating that question.
- Whether the 6 percent growth factor was ordinary income, and in which year it was includable.
Holdings
The Ninth Circuit split its holdings by parcel. Nine parcels qualified through collateral estoppel. The Booth parcel qualified on the merits. The contract rights relating to Timian and Bi-Mart were treated as boot received in 1967. The growth factor was disguised interest, includable when received, actually or constructively, rather than in 1967 (paras. 51, 57 to 58, 83 to 88).
| Property or item | Holding | Pinpoint |
|---|---|---|
| Nine parcels deeded directly to T. J. Starker | The government was collaterally estopped by Starker I from relitigating section 1031 | paras. 39, 51 |
| Booth (assigned contract right) | Equivalent of a fee interest. The transfer of the timberland "triggered a like-kind exchange" as to this parcel | paras. 62, 83 |
| Timian (residence titled to daughter) | No nonrecognition. Personal residence use is inconsistent with holding for investment, and title went to another person | paras. 57 to 58 |
| Bi-Mart (commercial building titled to daughter) | No nonrecognition, because T. J. Starker never received ownership himself | para. 58 |
| Timian and Bi-Mart, timing | The contract rights, insofar as they resulted in receipt of these parcels, were treated as boot received in 1967. Under section 1031(b), gain is recognized in 1967 to the extent of the parcels' fair market values on the dates title passed to his appointee | para. 86 |
| 6 percent growth factor | Disguised interest taxed as ordinary income, includable when received, actually or constructively, not in 1967 | paras. 85, 88 |
The court's reasoning on non-simultaneous transfers
The court reasoned that section 1031 has long been construed permissively. It found that neither a time gap between transfers nor the possibility of receiving cash defeated nonrecognition, where T. J. Starker intended from the outset to receive like-kind property and handled no cash. It declined to draw a line based on a "substantial" delay (paras. 70, 78, 80).
Purpose of the statute. The government relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b), which limits nonrecognition to exchanges meeting both the Code's description and its "underlying purpose." The court found that purpose "not entirely clear." It viewed the liquidity and valuation rationales as limited, and it noted precedent rejecting any reading that adds "a complex web of formal and substantive requirements" (paras. 64 to 70).
Possibility of cash. Relying on Alderson, Mercantile Trust, Coastal Terminals, and Carlton, the court concluded that "the mere possibility at the time of agreement that a cash sale might occur does not prevent the application of section 1031" (paras. 72 to 77).
Timing. The government argued that Alderson differed because no cash was possible when the taxpayer transferred his property. The court cited Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968), where some lack of simultaneity was tolerated, and declined to distinguish cases by the length of delay (paras. 79 to 80).
Cash equivalency and choses in action. The court rejected a "cash equivalency" test. It reasoned that title to land is no more equivalent to cash than a contract right to buy land. It quoted Jordan Marsh on the inequity of taxing "a paper gain which was still tied up in a continuing investment of the same sort." It treated a contract right to acquire ownership the same as ownership itself (paras. 81 to 82).
Limits. The court stated that a mere intent to escape tax is not sufficient (para. 77, note 11). It held that use of property solely as a personal residence is "antithetical" to holding it for investment, and it required continuity of title in the taxpayer (paras. 57 to 58). It acknowledged that its approach left the treatment of an exchange open until the consideration is received, and stated that "Congress can clarify its meaning" (para. 87).
How section 1031(a)(3) now sets identification and exchange periods
Under current IRC § 1031(a)(3), property received is treated as not like-kind if it is not identified on or before the day 45 days after the relinquished property transfer. The same applies if it is received after the earlier of 180 days after that transfer or the return due date (determined with regard to extension) for the transfer year.
The statutory text, stated exactly:
- Identification period. Property is treated as not like-kind if it "is not identified as property to be received in the exchange on or before the day which is 45 days after the date on which the taxpayer transfers the property relinquished in the exchange" (IRC § 1031(a)(3)(A)).
- Exchange period. Property is treated as not like-kind if it is received after the earlier of "the day which is 180 days after the date on which the taxpayer transfers the property relinquished in the exchange" or "the due date (determined with regard to extension) for the transferor's return" for the taxable year of the relinquished property transfer (IRC § 1031(a)(3)(B)(i) and (ii)).
Amendment history in the statutory notes:
| Change | Source | Effective date as stated |
|---|---|---|
| Paragraph (3) added | Pub. L. 98-369, § 77(a), July 18, 1984 | Transfers after July 18, 1984, and earlier transfers if the property is not received before January 1, 1987 (§ 77(b)(3)) |
| "on or before the day" replaced "before the day" in (a)(3)(A) | Pub. L. 99-514, § 1805(d), October 22, 1986 | As if included in the 1984 Act |
| "Real property" replaced "property" in (a)(1) | Pub. L. 115-97, § 13303(a), December 22, 2017 | Exchanges completed after December 31, 2017, subject to a transition rule (§ 13303(c)) |
Current section 1031 also provides that real property held primarily for sale is excluded (IRC § 1031(a)(2)) and that U.S. and foreign real property are not of like kind (IRC § 1031(h)). The Starker agreement allowed up to five years, while the current statute measures these periods in days.
Hypothetical example
This hypothetical uses round numbers to show how the current 45-day and 180-day periods and the boot and basis rules in section 1031(b) and (d) could interact. It is illustrative only, assumes all other requirements are met, and is not a prediction of how any actual exchange would be treated.
- An investor transfers investment real property worth $1,000,000, with a basis of $400,000. Call that transfer date Day 0.
- The investor identifies replacement real property on Day 40, which is on or before Day 45 (IRC § 1031(a)(3)(A)).
- Assume the investor's return due date, with extension, for the transfer year falls on Day 200. The earlier deadline is then Day 180 (IRC § 1031(a)(3)(B)).
- On Day 150, the investor receives replacement real property worth $900,000 plus $100,000 in cash.
- Realized gain is $600,000. Under IRC § 1031(b), gain is recognized only up to the $100,000 in cash.
- Under IRC § 1031(d), basis in the replacement property is $400,000, minus $100,000 of money received, plus $100,000 of gain recognized, or $400,000.
If the property had been received on Day 190, IRC § 1031(a)(3)(B) would treat it as not like-kind property.
Questions to take to a CPA or tax attorney
These questions may help frame a discussion with a qualified professional about how Starker and current section 1031 could bear on a specific transaction. They are prompts for discussion, not recommendations, and the answers depend on facts, current regulations, and guidance not covered on this page.
- How do the 45-day and 180-day periods in IRC § 1031(a)(3) apply to my transfer date and my return due date?
- Could a return extension, or the lack of one, change which deadline applies under IRC § 1031(a)(3)(B)(ii)?
- Would any cash or other property I receive be treated as boot under IRC § 1031(b), and how would basis be computed under IRC § 1031(d)?
- Does titling replacement property in a relative's name or an entity's name raise the continuity of title concerns discussed in Starker?
- Could intended personal use of a replacement property affect whether it is held for investment?
- How might any interest or growth amount earned during a delayed exchange be characterized and timed?
- Is my property real property held for productive use or investment, rather than held primarily for sale, under IRC § 1031(a)(1) and (a)(2)?
This page is general research, not tax, legal, or investment advice. Do not take any action based on this page without first consulting a qualified CPA or tax attorney who knows your facts.
Sources
- Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), No. 77-2826, decided August 24, 1979, paras. 2 to 7, 10 to 16, 39, 51, 57 to 58, 62 to 70, 72 to 83, 85 to 90 and note 11 (paragraph numbers per the public.resource.org text), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F2/602/602.F2d.1341.77-2826.html, accessed November 14, 2026.
- 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(B)(i) and (ii), (b), (d), (h), and statutory notes (Pub. L. 98-369, § 77(a) and (b)(3), Pub. L. 99-514, § 1805(d), Pub. L. 115-97, § 13303(a) and (c)), Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/1031, accessed November 14, 2026.